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RECENT . DECISIONS

CoNTRAcrs--CoNsIDERATION-PERFORMANCE OF ONE ALTERNATlVE
WHEN THERE Is DISPUTE AS TO WHICH Is OwEo-Defendant issued a
membership certificate to one Flowers providing for payment of $5000 in case
of accidental death or $500 in case of death due to heart disease. Later Flowers
was injured in an automobile accident and died an hour afterward. The beneficiary submitted proofs of loss, including a statement of a physician that death
was caused by "coronary thrombosis. Shock from auto accident about one hour
before death." Defendant sent to the beneficiary a draft for $500 clearly
stating on its face that the endorsement of the check would be a settlement
in full. After cashing the check, the beneficiary sued for an additional $4500;
on appeal from judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, held, reversed. Since defendant paid no more than it admitted was due to plaintiff,
there was no consideration to support the attempted accord and satisfaction.
One justice dissented. Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Me??s Assn., (Iowa
1947) 29 N.W. (2d) 559.
Although the law might well have developed otherwise, it is now generally
established that consideration is required in discharging a contract by accord
and satisfaction.1 On the general question whether payment of an amount
conceded to be due can be consideration for the release of some other amount
which is either unliquidated or disputed the courts are irreconcilably in conflict.2
After going to great lengths to show that defendant is under two distinct and
separate obligations, the court here decided that since one of these was admitted
to be due, its payment could not be consideration for a release of the other.1'

6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1851 (1938).
u2 A.L.R. 1219 (1938).
8 Weidner v. Standard Life and Accident Co., 130 Wis. 10, uo N.W. 246
(1906); American Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 234 Ala. 469, 175 S. 554 (1937);
Knights Templars' and Masons: Life Indem. Co. v. Crayton, 209 Ill. 550, 70 N.E.
1

2
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This ~onclusion would be sound only if the payment of one obligation is consistent with the additional duty of performing the other obligation.' Here,
however, the obligations were mutually exclusiv,e-only one could be enforced. Certainly the performance of an alternative might well be consideration
on the theory that each party surrendered the right of having a court decide
that the contract could be discharged by performance of the other alternative}'
The fact that each alternative involves merely the payment of money does not
change the legal principle, but it may have the effect of concealing it. The
dissenting opinion treats this as a single-claim type of contract and says that
the.rules that apply to double indemnity policies, which "are held to be in effect
two contracts," 6 are inapplicable to the single-claim situation. Although this
would seem to be merely a distinction in words, by stressing the idea that defendant's obligation must be considered as a unit, the mjnority is able to conclude that if any part of a debt is disputed the whole debt must be deemed
disputed or unliquidated. 7 Thus the case is brought within the well-recognized
principle that payment of a sum le~ thap. that claimed, in full discharge of a
single unliquidated or disputed obligation, is supported by consideration.8 An
orthodox application of the principles of contract law would seem to indicate
that there was consideration here regardless of which route the court might
choose to take in reaching that result. Perhaps the case is simply another manifestation of an attitude often assumed toward suits by beneficiaries against insurance companies.9 The courts have been astute in preventing what they consider to be legal technicalities from obstructing recovery.10

L. B. Leo.
1066 (1904); cf. Schultz v. Farmers Elevators Co., 174 Iowa 667 at 675, 156 N.W.
716 (1916), where the court says, "If it is admitted that one of two sums is due,
but there is a dispute as to which is the proper amount, the demand is uuliquidated
within the meaning of accord and satisfaction." In deciding the principal case the
court passed this off as dictum.
•
'Keene v. Gauen, (C.C.A. 5th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 723-; Ivy Court Realty Co.
v. Knapp, 79 Misc. 260, 139 N.Y.S. 918 (1913).
5 GRISMORE, CONTRACTS, § 66 (1947); North American Union v. Montenie,
68 Colo. 220, 189 P. 16 (1920); Long v. Aetna Lite Ins. Co., 259 Mich. 206, 242
N.W. 889 (1932); Perryman Burns Coal Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Coal Co., 128 Conn.
70, 20 A. (2d) 404 (1941).
6 Principal case at 578.
7 2 CoNTRACTS RESTAP™ENT, § 420(2) (1932); Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich.
58, 65 N.W. 664 (1895); Matlack Coal and Iron Corp. v. New York Quebracho
Extract Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 275; Ashland Coal and Coke Co. v.
Old Ben Coal Corp., 37 Del. 571, 187 A. 596 (1934); Meyers v. Acme Homestead
Assn., 18 La. App. 697, 138 S. 443 (1931); Schultz v. Farmers Elevators Co., 174
Iowa 667, 156 N.W. 716 (1916).
,
8 I WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 128 (1938); GRISMORE, CoNTRACTS,
§ 66 (1947).
9 "The insurer is always the dominant party in a transaction of this kind"; its
obligation is "closely akin to a fiduciary one." Principal case at 568. Contra: Long
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 259 Mich. 206, 242 N.W. 889 (1932).
10 To the extent that the majority considers defendant guilty of bad faith its
decision as regards consideration is rendered less authoritative. Where, as here, the
consideration rests upon settlement of a dispute, all courts require that the dispute

